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ABSTRACT An ever-increasing number of computing devices interconnected through wireless networks 
encapsulated in the cyber-physical-social systems and a significant amount of sensitive network data 
transmitted among them have raised security and privacy concerns. Intrusion detection system (IDS) is known 
as an effective defence mechanism and most recently machine learning (ML) methods are used for its 
development. However, Internet of Things (IoT) devices often have limited computational resources such as 
limited energy source, computational power and memory, thus, traditional ML-based IDS that require 
extensive computational resources are not suitable for running on such devices. This study thus is to design 
and develop a lightweight ML-based IDS tailored for the resource-constrained devices. Specifically, the study 
proposes a lightweight ML-based IDS model namely IMPACT (IMPersonation Attack deteCTion using deep 
auto-encoder and feature abstraction). This is based on deep feature learning with gradient-based linear 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) to deploy and run on resource-constrained devices by reducing the number 
of features through feature extraction and selection using a stacked autoencoder (SAE), mutual information 
(MI) and C4.8 wrapper. The IMPACT is trained on Aegean Wi-Fi Intrusion Dataset (AWID) to detect 
impersonation attack. Numerical results show that the proposed IMPACT achieved 98.22% accuracy with 
97.64% detection rate and 1.20% false alarm rate and outperformed existing state-of-the-art benchmark 
models. Another key contribution of this study is the investigation of the features in AWID dataset for its 
usability for further development of IDS.   
INDEX TERMS IoT security, intrusion detection, feature engineering, mutual information, machine 
learning, edge computing.
I. INTRODUCTION 
The role of edge devices has been elevated by the recent 
development of cloud and IoT technologies supporting in the 
need for intelligent, computing power and advanced services 
at the network edge. This new concept allows decentralised 
processes in interconnected devices. The rapid growth of 
interconnected smart and mobile devices has posed 
significant dangers on security and privacy of individuals, 
societies, nations and even in the extreme, the globe as a 
whole [1]. The impact of massive data breach and security 
threats is increasing with more advanced emerging 
applications such as healthcare, smart homes and cities and 
autonomous vehicles. All these domains deal with sensitive 
and confidential data, deeply mined from private activities 
on daily basis and the nature and scale of interconnection of 
the devices do not only seriously harm a single device or 
operator, however, all connected objects and involved 
humans in a large scale. 
Such devices however have unique security challenges 
[2], among which their limited computational resources such 
as limited energy source (e.g. battery power) and 
computational power (e.g. processors and memories) [3][4]. 
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The requirement of real-time processing also adds 
complexities on the development and deployment of both 
existing and new security measures. 
IDS has been effective as a next line of defence for such 
computing devices and networks and extensively studied 
since the seminal work by Denning [5]. IDS can be classified 
into two major categories, signature and anomaly based. The 
anomaly-based IDS is designed to detect unknown attacks 
that deviate from the profile of normal network activities. On 
the other hand, signature-based system can only detect 
known attacks that can match the patterns or signatures 
stored in a database. As cyber-attacks are evolving, the 
flexibility and adaptability of signature-based IDS need to be 
further developed.  
The concepts in machine learning (ML) and its subfield 
deep learning (DL) seem to be, by their inherent approaches, 
the right candidates for designing the adaptable IDS [6][7]. 
However, high-dimensional nature of ever-increasing data 
and iterative training process of models require extensive 
computational resources, thus, traditional ML-based IDS are 
not suitable for training and inference on resource-
constrained devices.  
Due to the high demand of computational resources for 
training and inference, the current approach is to transfer 
collected data to the central nodes (e.g. data centres) that have 
powerful resources. However, the distance between the 
devices and remote central nodes causes latency which could 
be a bottleneck to modern time-critical systems and 
applications that often require real-time processing of such big 
data. Besides, this centralised approach implies a single point 
of failure. For example, dysfunctionality or shutdown of a part 
of system leads to the failure of the entire system and has other 
issues including storage capacity, availability, scalability and 
privacy. 
To mitigate the aforementioned problems, a new 
paradigm, called edge computing [8] has emerged. Its 
principle relies on the ability to perform computational tasks 
locally such as data processing and analysis are performed at 
the edge of the network near or at data sources rather than the 
central nodes. This paradigm benefits from the proximity 
between the data sources and computing nodes and also can 
solve the problem of poor or absent connectivity and 
bandwidth which are always required in the cloud-based 
systems. It is not surprising that cloud to the edge is one of the 
top strategic technologies for 2018 and 2020 according to a 
report by Gartner [9][10]. 
To compute efficiently and effectively closer to or at the 
edge of the network, the utilisation of ML approaches that 
can enable dimensionality reduction of data and efficient 
detection is critical. This study investigates potential ML 
methods to design and develop an efficient and effective 
ML-based IDS for the resource constrained edge devices 
which involve processing of a large amount of data and 
training of models. The key contributions of this study are: 
 to determine the feasibility of a lightweight machine-
learning IDS to be designed and deployed on resource 
constrained devices, 
 to demonstrate, building upon earlier work [11][12], the 
effectiveness of extracted abstract features using a deep 
SAE, along with mutual information theoretic feature 
selection that outperforms other state-of-the-art models, 
 to propose an architecture of gradient based SVM for the 
proposed IDS model, 
 to analyse the temporal features within AWID dataset 
and their usability for the further development of IDS, 
and 
 finally, to provide a new benchmark result on AWID 
dataset without using temporal features.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 
II introduces the proposed IMPACT algorithm outlining its 
three novel concepts. Section III analyses and evaluates the 
performance of IMPACT and existing benchmark models 
along with investigations of the features of the AWID dataset 
and Section IV concludes with recommendations for further 
research. 
 
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
A.  Data 
To train, test and evaluate the proposed model, AWID 
dataset [13] was used due to its unique features in 
comparison with other existing datasets. While it contains 
new attack types, the AWID dataset is simulated using real-
world wireless network which is a critical feature for modern 
IoT environments. 
The dataset is divided by the types of attack classes. 
“ATK” set contains 16 attack classes and “CLS” has 4 
classes in which 15 attacks are categorised by attack 
methodologies: impersonation, flooding and injection. For 
this study, “CLS” dataset is used and impersonation attack is 
considered only. The impersonation attacks included in the 
dataset are Caffe Latte, Evil Twin, and Hirte attack. Caffe 
Latte and Hirte are keystream retrieving attacks and Evil 
Twin is a man-in-the-middle attack according to their attack 
purpose. The tools used to implement the attacks include the 
Aircrack-ng suit, MDK3 tool, the Metasploit framework and 
custom tools made by authors using C language and the 
Lorcon2 library. Attackers mostly use the Airbase tool 
contained within Aircrack-ng suit for releasing Evil Twin 
attacks. 
To gather the data, the authors created a realistic resource 
constrained environment of small office/home office 
(SOHO) wireless network infrastructure that consisted of a 
number of mobile and static clients such as smartphones, 
tablets, smart TV and laptops and a single mobile attacker 
node to release the attacks. A single Access Point (AP) was 
set up with the WEP encryption. 
The dataset in the original form is imbalanced in such 
manner that the size of the normal class is significantly larger 
than the attack class with the ratio of 10:1 for the training set 
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and 11:1 for the test set. Since this configuration could result 
in a bias during the model training phase, the dataset is 
balanced making the ratio 1:1 between the two classes for 
both training and test sets through pre-processing [12]. 
B.  IMPACT 
The IMPACT has three main components: i. feature 
extraction, ii. feature selection and iii. classification. 
Through feature extraction and selection, the dimensionality 
of data required for training and testing the model is reduced, 
increasing the efficiency of the model in terms of 
computational cost required to deploy on the resource-
constrained devices. Stacked autoencoder (SAE), a type of 
deep neural network, was used for feature extraction and 
mutual information (MI) and C4.8 wrapper for feature 
selection. For the detection task, SVM with gradient descent 
optimisation was adopted that they were more effective in 
terms of detection performance compared to other models 
based on the experiment results. 
To build the model, reduced AWID training and test 
datasets with 154 features were fed to the SAE. Through the 
SAE, a set of 50 new features with new data instances were 
extracted and appended to both the original training and test 
sets, producing the larger dataset with 204 features as a 
whole. This dataset was the input for the feature selection to 
find the reduced optimal feature subset and the reduced 
training and test sets with the final 5 selected features were 
used for training and testing of the ML classifier which 
produces the best classification result. 
As shown in Fig. 1., an autoencoder (AE) [14] is a type 
of unsupervised neural network algorithm that learns from 
unlabeled data using backpropagation. It sets the output 
values to be the same as the input values, trying to learn the 
hypothesis function, 
 
ℎ𝑊,𝑏(𝑥) ≈ 𝑥 (1) 
 
The AE consists of an encoder and a decoder in which 
the encoder compresses input data into a low dimensional 
representation and the decoder reconstructs the input data 
from the low dimensional representation. In other words, the 
input data is replicated at the output layer. During the process 
of encoding, the input feature vectors are converted to an 
abstract feature vector and the dimensionality of the input 
data space can be reduced. 
To achieve this, several constraints should be put on the 
network. For instance, setting the number of hidden neurons 
less than that of the input features, and some meaningful 
representations of the data can be discovered while 
attempting to reconstruct the input with the limited number 
of hidden neurons. Consequently, if some correlations exist 
between the features, the algorithm would be able to find 
them. 
The constraint (2) is imposed on the hidden neurons in 
the encoders to compress the representation of the input data 
and extract features, where ?̂?𝑗 (3) is the average activation 
and 𝑎𝑗(𝑥)  is the activation of the hidden neuron 𝑗 
respectively. If the activation of the neuron 𝑗 is 1, the neuron 
is active and if the activation is 0 (or −1 if 𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ is used as 
activation function instead of 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑑 ), the neuron is 
inactive. The variable 𝜌 denotes the sparsity parameter and 
is set to the value near 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  to force the neurons to be 
inactive most of the time. 
 
?̂?𝑗 = 𝜌 (2) 
?̂?𝑗 =
1
𝑚
∑[𝑎𝑗(𝑥)]
𝑚
𝑖=1
 (3) 
The cost function of the AE is specified by the mean squared 
error (MSE) function (4), given m training instances and the 
cost function for a single instance 
1
2
‖ℎ𝑊,𝑏(𝑥
(𝑖)) − 𝑦(𝑖)‖
2
. 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
1
𝑚
∑
1
2
‖ℎ𝑊,𝑏(𝑥
(𝑖)) − 𝑦(𝑖)‖
2
𝑚
𝑖=1
 (4) 
L2 regularisation (5), also called weight decay term, is added 
to the cost function, which will prevent overfitting by 
reducing the magnitude of the weights 𝑊𝑗𝑖
(𝑙)
 between neuron 
i in layer l and neuron j in layer l+1:  
where L is the total number of layers in the network and n 
and k are the number of neurons in layer l and l+1 
respectively. 
Ω𝐿2𝑅𝑒𝑔 =
1
2
∑ ∑ ∑(𝑊𝑗𝑖
(𝑙)
)2
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐿−1
𝑙=1
 (5) 
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Fig. 1.  Autoencoder (AE), where m and n indicate the number of neurons in 
the layer, x is an input feature, b is a bias, a is an activation and y is an output. 
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In addition, a penalty term, called sparsity regularisation (6) 
is added to the cost function to penalize ?̂?𝑗  that diverges 
from 𝜌 using the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [15]. KL 
is a measure of the different between two different 
distributions. This function has the value either zero if (2) is 
satisfied or higher if ?̂?𝑗 diverges from 𝜌. Hence, minimising 
this term encourages ?̂?𝑗 to be close to 𝜌. 𝑆2 is the number of 
hidden neurons within the encoder.   
 
Ω𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = ∑ 𝐾𝐿(𝜌 ∥ ?̂?𝑗)
𝑠2
𝑗=1
= ∑ 𝜌 log
𝜌
?̂?𝑗
+ (1 − 𝜌) log
1 − 𝜌
1 − ?̂?𝑗
𝑠2
𝑗=1
 (6) 
The overall cost function is then the sum of MSE, L2 
regularisation and sparsity regularisation term, where 𝜆 and 
𝛽  controls the strength of L2 regularisation and sparsity 
respectively.  
𝐽𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑒(𝑊, 𝑏) = 𝑀𝑆𝐸 + 𝜆 ∗ Ω𝐿2𝑅𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽 ∗ Ω𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 (7) 
A stacked (or deep) autoencoder (SAE) consists of 
multiple AEs connected from one layer to the subsequent 
layer. The output of the previous encoder is the input of the 
next encoder and from this structure, higher representations, 
i.e. features, of the input data can be found. The reason why 
the SAEs was chosen is explained by the fact that a single 
AE behaves too greedily and important information for 
accurate classification of the target class could be discarded. 
The SAE prevents such behaviour by refining gradually the 
neurons in the hidden layers. In other words, the SAE learns 
a better representation of the input data than a single AE. 
However, as more encoders need to be trained, the training 
time and complexity of model are increased. For the number 
of hidden neurons for two encoder layers, 100 and 50 were 
chosen respectively which were found to be optimal for the 
AWID impersonation dataset according to Aminanto et al. 
[11]. 
Following feature extraction using SAE, IMPACT 
performs feature selection to find the optimal feature subset 
from the whole feature set comprising of the original and 
extracted features produced from the feature extraction 
stage. This process finds the most relevant features and 
removes irrelevant features so that it reduces the complexity 
and computational cost of the model and also improves the 
detection performance. Hence, the feature selection can 
make the model both efficient and effective achieving the 
aim of this study. Among a variety of available methods, this 
study utilises mutual information (MI) and C4.8 wrapper. 
MI is a quantity that measures the mutual dependence 
between two random variables. That is how much 
information one random variable has about another.  In other 
words, it is the indication of the reduction in uncertainty of 
one random variable when given the knowledge about 
another. MI is related to the concept of entropy H (8) which 
is the expected information content in a random variable X:  
 
𝐻(𝑋) = − ∑ 𝑃(𝑥𝑖)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃(𝑥𝑖).
𝑖
 (8) 
Herein P denotes the probability that an event with index 𝑖 
occurs. Conditional entropy (9) of two random variables 𝑋 
and 𝑌 with values 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑦𝑗 can be defined as  
 
𝐻(𝑋|𝑌) = − ∑ 𝑃(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗)𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑃(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗)
𝑃(𝑦𝑗)
𝑖,𝑗
 (9) 
where 𝑃(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗) is the joint probability distribution. Then, 
the definition of MI of two discrete variables X and Y is given 
by 
 
𝐼(𝑋; 𝑌) = 𝐻(𝑋) − 𝐻(𝑋|𝑌) 
= 𝐻(𝑋) + 𝐻(𝑌) − 𝐻(𝑋, 𝑌) 
= ∑ 𝑃(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗)𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑃(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗)
𝑃(𝑥𝑖)𝑃(𝑦𝑗)
𝑖,𝑗
 
(10) 
where 𝐻(𝑋, 𝑌) is the joint entropy. The higher the MI value 
is, less the uncertainty in a variable is and vice versa. Zero 
MI means the variables are independent.  
C4.8 wrapper [16] is a decision tree-based algorithm 
extended from ID3. It uses pruning strategies to avoid 
overfitting. During the learning process of C4.8 algorithm, a 
decision tree is built first from the given training set using 
ID3, and then the learnt tree is converted into a set of rules, 
each of which is a rule for the path from the root to a leaf 
node. Each rule is pruned where preconditions that improve 
the estimated accuracy are removed. The pruned rules are 
then sorted by the accuracy and considered when subsequent 
instances are classified. A feature is useful for generalisation 
if it is present as a node or part of the rules and in contrast, 
the removed features are not important if they do not 
improve the accuracy. C4.8 utilises the measure of 
Bottleneck 
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Fig. 2.  Stacked autoencoder (SAE) 
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information gain (IG), which is exactly the MI, to select 
features and these features are then used as a subset for ML 
classifiers. Finally, IMPACT classifies network data into 
two classes using support vector classifier: normal and 
attack. For this task, linear support vector machine (SVM) 
with gradient descent as the optimiser is utilised. 
Linear SVM is a supervised machine learning algorithm 
used to deal with binary classification problems that have 
two classes. Many possible boundaries or hyperplanes that 
can separate the classes exist, thereby a method to find the 
best one is required. SVM aims to find the optimal decision 
boundary (or maximum-margin hyperplane) in the way that 
the margin between the boundary and the nearest data 
instances of the classes is maximised as shown in Fig. 3. The 
nearest data instances that define the maximum margin (or 
hyperplane) are called support vectors. 
Given a training data of 𝑛 instances (𝐱1, 𝑦1), … , (𝐱𝑛, 𝑦𝑛), 
where 𝑦𝑖 is the true class of input data 𝐱𝑖  (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛)  and 
either 1 or −1, the decision boundary is defined as 
 
𝑓(𝐱𝑖) = 𝐰
T𝐱𝑖 + 𝑏 = 0 (11) 
where 𝐰 is the weight vector and 𝑏 is the bias. 
To prevent the data instances from lying on the incorrect 
side, the following constraints are added for each 𝑖: 
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 = 1, 𝐰
T𝐱𝑖 + 𝑏 ≥ 1 (12) 
𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 = −1, 𝐰
T𝐱𝑖 + 𝑏 ≤ −1 (13) 
and these can be combined into 
 
𝑦𝑖(𝐰
T𝐱𝑖 + 𝑏) ≥ 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. (14) 
SVM can solve non-linearly separable problems by 
utilising the method called kernel trick that maps the original 
data into higher dimensional space to make the data linearly 
separable. A potential limitation is that SVM may require 
extensive training time. Though SVM produced high 
performance results, the training times are often too high in 
comparison to other classifiers. However, in this study, by 
using a linear form of SVM, the training time was reduced 
while achieving comparable results. 
SVM uses hinge loss as its loss function for optimisation. 
In linear SVM, for an output 𝑦𝑖 = ±1, the hinge loss can be 
defined as  
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0, 1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑓(𝐱𝑖)). (15) 
 If 𝑓(𝐱𝑖)  predicts the correct class, then 𝑦𝑖  and 𝑓(𝐱𝑖) 
have the same sign and 𝑦𝑖𝑓(𝐱𝑖) ≥ 1, so the loss is zero. If  
𝑦𝑖  and 𝑓(𝐱𝑖) have the opposite sign and 𝑦𝑖𝑓(𝐱𝑖) < 1, the 
loss increases linearly. The hinge loss penalizes incorrect 
classifications within 𝑦𝑖𝑓(𝐱𝑖) < 1  that corresponds to a 
margin in SVM.  
 
 
 
The objective function 𝐽(𝐰) (18) consists of two terms: 
regularisation term and loss. As the hinge loss function is 
convex, ML convex optimisers can be used. For 
optimisation, the objective function should be minimised: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐽(𝐰) =
𝜆
2
‖𝐰‖2
+
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0, 1 − 𝑦
𝑖
𝑓(𝐱𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
(18) 
   
Gradient descent takes steps iteratively to update 
parameters in the direction of the gradient. To run gradient 
descent, derivatives with respect to 𝑏  and 𝐰 are required. 
However, the hinge loss is not differentiable, thus, a sub-
gradient should to be used with respect to w and 𝑓(𝐱𝑖) as 
follows: 
 
 
𝜕
𝜕𝐰
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0, 1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑓(𝐱𝑖))
= {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑓(𝐱𝑖) ≥ 1
−𝑦𝑖𝐱𝑖, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
(19) 
 
III. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 
The confusion matrix is commonly used to evaluate the 
performance of a ML model, particularly for binary 
classification which is the case in this study. Based on the 
confusion matrix, the below evaluations measures are 
intended to give information on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the proposed algorithm. The evaluation measure 
used are accuracy (Acc), detection rate (DR), false alarm rate 
(FAR), F-measure (F1), Mathew’s correlation coefficient 
(Mcc) and Time To Build (TTB) and can be calculated using 
the below equations.  
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐 =  
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
(20) 
 
𝐷𝑅(𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙) =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
(21) 
 
𝑐(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑓(𝐱𝑖)) = 1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑓(𝐱𝑖) (16) 
𝑐(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑓(𝐱𝑖)) 
= {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑓(𝐱𝑖) ≥ 1
1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑓(𝐱𝑖), 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
(17) 
Fig. 3.  Linear Support Vector Machine 
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Maximum margin 
Support vectors 
Decision boundary 
(Maximum-margin 
hyperplane) 
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𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
 
(22) 
 
𝐹𝐴𝑅 =  
𝐹𝑃
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
 
(23) 
 
𝐹𝑁𝑅 =  
𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃
 
(24) 
 
𝐹1 =  
2𝑇𝑃
2𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
(25) 
 
𝑀𝑐𝑐
=  
(𝑇𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑁) − (𝐹𝑃 ∗ 𝐹𝑁)
√(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃)(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)(𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃)(𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁)
 
(26) 
 
 
A. Theoretic Feature Selection using Mutual Information 
After the feature extraction process, MI values for all 204 
features consisting of original 154 and extracted 50 features 
were calculated. The features then were ranked from the 
highest to the lowest MI values. Among 204 features, 83 
features were found to have the MI values greater than 0 and 
the rest 121 features had the value 0 which means that they 
had no relevance to the attack class. All 50 extracted features 
were among the afore-mentioned 83 features whereas 33 were 
original features of which only 4 features were within top 20 
features. This suggests that the SAE was able to successfully 
extract the features that are relevant to the attack class with 
meaningful representations. In turn, it demonstrates the 
effectiveness of SAE as a feature extraction method to build a 
lightweight IDS by discovering relatively more meaningful 
features and reducing the dimensionality of data and the 
complexity of the model.  
Among the most relevant 20 features based on the MI 
values were original features 4, 7, 8, 9, 38 and 82, however, 
there was some redundancy that the features 4 and 7 had 
exactly the same data instances resulting in the same MI 
values and so did 8 and 9. Therefore, features 7 and 9 were 
removed from the datasets for training the model. The top 20 
features based on MI values are 8, 82, 4, 38, 157, 162, 168, 
160, 188, 161, 199, 176, 159, 191, 182, 186, 195, 156, 158 and 
165 [12]. 
To find the optimal subset from the top 20 features, Parker 
et al. [6] experimented five wrapper algorithms to select 
features and evaluated in terms of the number of features and 
Acctraining time with the aim of minimising computational 
cost for resource-constrained devices. C4.8 has taken the least 
time compared to the other algorithms. In terms of the number 
of features, C4.8 had only one or two more features than RF, 
MLP, and RBF that were significantly slower than C4.8 even 
though they resulted in the smaller number of features. 
Though logistic regression was the second fastest algorithm, it 
had the number of features twice or more than all the other 
algorithms, significantly increasing the complexity and 
computational cost of the model. The selected feature subset 
consists of five features including three original features 4, 8 
and 82 and two extracted features 156 and 157.  
B. Gradient-based Optimisation 
The weights of SVM are found using gradient decent 
algorithm. Learning rate of 0.00001 achieved the highest DR 
and lowest FNR, however, it showed the worst performance 
in Acc, Precision, FAR, F1 and Mcc. There is a trade-off 
between DR and FAR as DR tends to fall whereas FAR 
improves. The overall performance slightly improves between 
0.00001 and 0.1 and rapidly increases between 0.1 and 0.5. 
Acc, FAR, Precision, F1 and Mcc gradually increase until 0.1 
then rapidly improves until 0.5. Therefore, the learning rates 
around 0.5 – 0.51 and 0.52 – were investigated. In addition to 
that, 0.5 has the highest Acc, F1 and Mcc, however, also the 
second highest Precision and second lowest FAR and DR, 
thus, 0.5 was chosen. Learning rate of 0.55 has the highest 
Precision and lowest FAR, however, worse in other metrics 
than 0.5. The final results using learning rate of 0.5 are 
provided in Table I.  
C. Comparisons between baselines and IMPACT 
The most recent research for impersonation attack using 
AWID datasets were performed by Kolias et al. [13], 
Aminanto et al. [17], D-FES Corr [11] and DEMISe-RBFC 
and DETEReD [12]. As shown in Table I, IMPACT achieved 
the highest F1 and Mcc while Acc is the second highest and 
FAR is the second lowest. Kolias et al. [13] has the lowest 
Mcc and the highest FAR. This is considered to be due to the 
imbalanced dataset used and feature selection method that 
Kolias et al. [13] utilised only expert knowledge without any 
ML, data-driven or statistical methods. Compared to D-FES 
Corr [11], though IMPACT has higher FAR by 0.16% and 
lower Acc by 0.004%, it achieved higher DR by 1.73%, higher 
F1 by 2.04% and higher Mcc by 1.4%.  
TABLE I  
COMPARISONS BETWEEN IMPACT AND THE STATE-OF-THE-ART MODELS 
Model 
No of 
features 
Acc DR FAR F1 Mcc TTB 
IMPACT 5 (3+2) 98.22 97.64 01.20 98.21 96.45 299.97* 
DEMISe-RBFC [12] 7 (4+3) 98.00 99.04 03.00 97.98 96.02 301.53* 
DETEReD [12] 5 (3+2) 98.04 99.07 02.96 98.01 96.09 603.33** 
D-FES-Corr [11] 12 98.26 95.91 01.04 96.17 95.05 1264.00 
Kolias et al. [13] 20 94.91 97.23 74.21 97.37 22.12 NRA 
Aminanto et al. [17] 35 97.60 85.00 02.36 NRA NRA NRA 
The performance of IMPACT is measured on learning rate of 0.5 on the feature subset of 
three original features (4, 8 and 82) and two abstract features (156 and 157) only.  
* The time to build (TTB) for the models includes the 293s required for SAE. 
** Includes TTB required for both SAE and C4.8 wrapper. 
NRA = No results available. 
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Even though DETEReD and DEMISe-RBFC achieved the 
highest DR and excelled in Acc, F1 and Mcc, DETEReD has 
the highest FAR and DEMISe-RBFC the second highest. Both 
have much higher FAR—more than double—than either 
IMPACT or D-FES Corr [11]. Considering the throughput of 
network data in the era of big data, this amount of false alarms 
cannot be ignored because it will cause much higher cost to 
network administrators than IMPACT. Within the context of 
IDS, minimising FAR is crucial. In comparison with 
DETEReD and DEMISe-RBFC, the IMPACT has lower DR, 
however, it is still higher than those of three other models (D-
FES Corr, Kolias et al. and Aminanto et al.) and has FAR less 
than half of the results of DETEReD and DEMISe-RBFC. The 
reason why DETEReD had the better result for DR is that it 
had more number of TP than that of IMPACT whereas 
IMPACT had a higher sum of TP and TN for Acc than that of 
DETEReD. The values of the denominators for both DR and 
Acc were the same in the two models. For Mcc, IMPACT had 
a higher proportion of the numerator per denominator than 
DETEReD. 
IMPACT performed better with the optimised subset 
selected, using C4.8, from the top 20 features rather than 10 
features in contrast to the result produced by DEMISe in 
which the authors’ logistic regression classifier showed better 
performance with the optimised subset from the 10 features.  
The training time of the model is also an important 
measure for computational time efficiency of the model. 
IMPACT has TTB requirement considering of SAE and 
classifier training time, but excluding the time required for 
C4.8 wrapper as the feature subset was provided by the authors 
of the earlier work, DEMISe, and there was no need of re-
running C4.8. Kolias et al. [13] and Aminanto et al. [17] do 
not provide the exact model build time. All the models were 
run on different hardware setups, thus, the models cannot have 
fair comparison in terms of training time. However, in terms 
of the number of features which could be a measure of 
memory efficiency of the model, IMPACT utilises the least 
number of features, significantly less than the three other 
benchmark models (D-FES, Kolias et al. and Aminanto et al.), 
while outperforming them.  
Overall, the IMPACT achieved the performance t 
mitigates the drawbacks of DETEReD and D-FES Corr as 
FAR is significantly lower than DETEReD, DR is better than 
D-FES Corr and F1 and Mcc are the best among all the other 
models. Based on the evaluation of the comparison of 
performance results, it proves the effectiveness of SAE, MI 
and C4.8 wrapper methods for the dimensionality reduction of 
dataset for the lightweight IDS reducing computational cost in 
terms of time and space. 
TABLE II  
SELECTED FEATURES USING C4.8  
Feature Name Description 
4 frame.time_epoch Epoch time when this frame was captured 
8 frame.len Frame length on the wire 
82 wlan.seq Sequence number 
156 Extracted feature Extracted from SAE 
157 Extracted feature Extracted from SAE 
D. AWID Feature Analysis 
Each feature within AWID dataset has been investigated in 
order to verify if any of them contains temporal information. 
The temporal features (a.k.a. time domain features), which are 
simple to extract and have an easy physical interpretation. 
However, if the presence of information within the temporal 
Fig. 4. Feature 4 Epoch Time in Wireshark 
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Fig. 5.  Performance comparisons between IMPACT and the state-of-the-
art-models in terms of FAR (Kolias et al. is out of range.) 
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Fig. 4.  Performance comparisons between IMPACT and the state-of-the-
art-models in terms of Acc, Dr, F1 and Mcc (Kolias et al.’s Acc and Mcc  
and Aminanto et al.’s DR, F1 and Mcc are out of range.) 
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features are used for the learning algorithm, then it will 
remember the time of each attack during the training. 
Consequently, detected observations in testing set rely on 
temporal information learned from training set. That being 
said, this information must not be used in training or in testing 
the model as in a real scenario an IDS never knows the actual 
time of attack.  
In impersonation attack such as Evil Twin and Caffe Latte, 
it is found that the number of beacon frames in the victim’s 
network are almost doubled and about half of these frames 
contained intrusive characteristics, that is, the impersonation 
attacks occurred during these durations [13]. 
Unfortunately, we found that Kolias et al. [13] set up an 
attacker and attacks were injected at particular times in their 
experiments and these were recorded in some of their features.  
The features used in AWID dataset were derived from 
Wireshark and the full list can be found in the official AWID 
dataset website [18] and Wireshark display filter reference 
page [19]. Among the selected features in Table II, the top 
ranked raw feature 4 (frame.time_epoch) is the epoch time 
when the frame was captured as shown in Fig. 4 and the 
redundant feature 7 (frame.time_relative) also has the same 
characteristics as feature 4 and therefore, it had the same MI 
value as feature 4 as mentioned in Section III-A. Additionally, 
feature 38 (radiotap.mactime) is MAC timestamp, another 
temporary feature, defined in Radiotap [20] as “Value in 
microseconds of the MAC’s 64-bit 802.11 Time 
Synchronization Function timer when the first bit of the 
MPDU arrived at the MAC. For received frames only.” [20]. 
We found that the benchmark models, DEMISe and 
DETEReD utilised the temporal feature of 4, while Aminanto 
et al. and D-FES utilised all three temporal features of 4, 7, 
and 38. 
 
TABLE III  
PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF IMPACT WITHOUT TEMPORAL FEATURES 
Acc DR FAR F1 Mcc 
94.72 94.04 04.61 94.68 89.43 
 
As the final selected feature set of IMPACT has only 
temporal feature (frame.time_epoch), the model trained 
without the temporal feature was experimented and the results 
showed that the model without the feature had worse 
performance than the model with the feature. Therefore, it has 
been proved that the temporal feature significantly contributed 
to the performance of the model and the feature selection 
method was effective, however, in fact, this feature is not valid 
to use for the development of IDS. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper presents the development of a machine learning 
based approach of an IDS offering the ability to be deployed 
and run directly on the resource-constrained devices. This was 
achieved through a smart strategy aiming to reducing the 
complexity of the model which consists of two main steps. 
First to the ability reduce the number of features through 
feature extraction and selection using SAE and MI and to 
evaluate their effectiveness in both efficiency and 
performance. The results showed that the extracted abstract 
features were selected as top features among the whole set of 
original and extracted features. MI values of the features could 
be utilised to select most relevant features and remove 
irrelevant features, resulting in the reduction of the complexity 
of the model without decreasing the performance, however, 
outperforming other models. 
The second step consisted in training and testing the linear 
SVM using gradient descent. In comparison with other models 
using different classifiers or SVM, (providing higher training 
time on the AWID impersonation dataset), the IMPACT 
demonstrated better performance including much lower FAR 
compared to DEMISe models. With the investigation of 
temporal features existing in AWID dataset, IMPACT 
provided its new benchmark results without using any 
temporal features in AWID dataset proving that it is the only 
ML-based IDS tailored for resource constrained devices and 
which is independent of such features in contrary to its 
competing DEMISe, DETEReD and D-FES algorithms. 
Based on these findings, the ways for further development 
could be proposed. Firstly, successful use of an SAE, opens 
perspectives for the use of other deep neural networks to 
extract abstract features. Secondly, this study only focuses on 
impersonation attack, however, there are two other type of 
attacks in AWID dataset, flooding and injection. IMPACT has 
not been yet tested against these, neither on newer attack types 
found in wireless IoT networks. Finally, IMPACT needs to be 
trained and tested on additional datasets providing their own 
features existing within the IDS research in order to prove its 
usefulness and effectiveness. Today, most wireless sensor 
network used as an automatic data acquisition and 
transmission system in monitoring applications is based on 
802.15.4. However, the dataset in [7] is built on 802.11. For 
the usefulness and coverage of the proposed algorithm, in our 
future work, the proposed algorithm will be tested on a new 
benchmark dataset created on 802.15.4.  
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This work was supported by the Samsung’s Global Outreach 
Fund under the grant agreement No. P10458. 
REFERENCES 
[1] R. Ande, B. Adebisi, M. Hammoudeh, and J. Saleem, “Internet of 
Things: Evolution and technologies from a security perspective,” 
Sustain. Cities Soc., p. 101728, Jul. 2019. 
[2] A. Mosenia and N. K. Jha, “A comprehensive study of security of 
internet-of-things,” IEEE Trans. Emerg. Top. Comput., vol. 5, no. 4, 
pp. 586–602, Oct. 2017. 
[3] S. Raza, L. Wallgren, and T. Voigt, “SVELTE: Real-time intrusion 
detection in the Internet of Things,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 11, no. 8, 
pp. 2661–2674, Nov. 2013. 
[4] G. Choudhary, V. Sharma, I. You, K. Yim, I.-R. Chen, and J.-H. 
Cho, “Intrusion Detection Systems for Networked Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles: A Survey,” Jul. 2018. 
[5] D. E. Denning, “An Intrusion-Detection Model,” IEEE Trans. Softw. 
Eng., vol. SE-13, no. 2, pp. 222–232, Feb. 1987. 
[6] Y. Xin et al., “Machine Learning and Deep Learning Methods for 
Cybersecurity,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 35365–35381, 2018. 
[7] A. Shenfield, D. Day, and A. Ayesh, “Intelligent intrusion detection 
 VOLUME XX, 2017 9 
systems using artificial neural networks,” ICT Express, May 2018. 
[8] W. Yu et al., “A Survey on the Edge Computing for the Internet of 
Things,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 6900–6919, 2018. 
[9] K. Panetta, “Gartner Top 10 Strategic Technology Trends for 2018 - 
Smarter With Gartner,” 2017. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartner-top-10-
strategic-technology-trends-for-2018/. [Accessed: 14-Nov-2018]. 
[10] K. Panetta, “Gartner Top 10 Strategic Technology Trends for 2020 - 
Smarter With Gartner,” 2019. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartner-top-10-
strategic-technology-trends-for-2020/. [Accessed: 13-Nov-2019]. 
[11] M. E. Aminanto, R. Choi, H. C. Tanuwidjaja, P. D. Yoo, and K. Kim, 
“Deep Abstraction and Weighted Feature Selection for Wi-Fi 
Impersonation Detection,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur., vol. 13, 
no. 3, pp. 621–636, Mar. 2018. 
[12] L. R. Parker, P. D. Yoo, T. A. Asyhari, L. Chermak, Y. Jhi, and K. 
Taha, “DEMISe: Interpretable Deep Extraction and Mutual 
Information Selection Techniques for IoT Intrusion Detection,” in 
Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Availability, 
Reliability and Security, 2019, pp. 98:1--98:10. 
[13] C. Kolias, G. Kambourakis, A. Stavrou, and S. Gritzalis, “Intrusion 
Detection in 802.11 Networks: Empirical Evaluation of Threats and a 
Public Dataset,” IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 
184–208, 2016. 
[14] “Unsupervised Feature Learning and Deep Learning Tutorial.” 
[Online]. Available: 
http://ufldl.stanford.edu/tutorial/unsupervised/Autoencoders/. 
[Accessed: 01-Mar-2020]. 
[15] S. Kullback and R. A. Leibler, “On Information and Sufficiency,” 
Ann. Math. Stat., vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 79–86, Mar. 1951. 
[16] J. R. Quinlan, C4.5: Programs for Machine Learning. San Francisco, 
CA, USA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 1993. 
[17] M. E. Aminanto and K. Kim, “Detecting impersonation attack in wifi 
networks using deep learning approach,” in Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial 
Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2017, vol. 10144 
LNCS, pp. 136–147. 
[18] “List of Attributes - Wireless Security Datasets Project.” [Online]. 
Available: http://icsdweb.aegean.gr/awid/attributes.html. [Accessed: 
23-Sep-2019]. 
[19] “Wireshark · Display Filter Reference: Frame.” [Online]. Available: 
https://www.wireshark.org/docs/dfref/f/frame.html. [Accessed: 23-
Sep-2019]. 
[20] “Radiotap - TSFT.” [Online]. Available: 
https://www.radiotap.org/fields/TSFT.html. [Accessed: 26-Feb-
2020]. 
 
SEO JIN LEE received the BSc degree in Computing 
from University College London (UCL), United 
Kingdom in 2017. She is currently pursuing the MSc by 
Research degree at Centre for Electronic Warfare, 
Information and Cyber (CEWIC) within Cranfield 
School of Defence and Security based in the Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham. Her 
research interests focus on data-driven intelligence including big data 
analytics and machine learning techniques applied to cyber defence and 
security problems. 
 
PAUL D. YOO is currently with the CSIS within 
Birkbeck College at the University of London leading 
BIDA Data-driven Cyber Security Laboratory. Prior to 
this, he held academic/research posts in Cranfield 
(Defence Academy of the UK), Sydney (USyd) and 
South Korea (KAIST). In his career, he has amassed 
more than 80 prestigious journal and conference publications, has been 
awarded more than US$ 2.3 million in project funding, and a number of 
prestigious international and national awards for his work in advanced data 
analytics, machine learning and secure systems research, notably IEEE 
Outstanding Leadership Award, Capital Markets CRC Award, Emirates 
Foundation Research Award, and the ICT Fund Award. Most recently, he 
won the prestigious Samsung award for research to protect IoT devices 
using machine-learning approach and Research England’s Global Challenge 
Research Fund (GCRF) for research to protect global environment (e.g. 
marine resources) using edge intelligence techniques. Paul currently serves 
as an Associate Editor for IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing, 
IEEE Access and Journal of Big Data Research (Elsevier). He had served as 
an Editor for IEEE COMML (big data and machine learning areas) from 
2014 to 2019. He is also affiliated with the University of Sydney and Korea 
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) as a Visiting 
Professor. Paul is a Senior Member of the IEEE and a Fellow of HEA. 
  
A. TAUFIQ ASYHARI received the B.Eng. degree 
(First Class Honors) in Electrical and Electronic 
Engineering from Nanyang Technological University 
(NTU), Singapore, in 2007, and the Ph.D. degree in 
Information Engineering from the University of 
Cambridge, U.K., in 2012. He has been a Senior Lecturer 
in Internet of Things with Coventry University, U.K., 
since 2018, where he is currently with the Centre for Data 
Science and School of Computing, Electronics and Mathematics. He holds 
visiting appointments at Cranfield University, U.K. and Telkom University, 
Indonesia. He previously held full-time/visiting positions at National Chiao 
Tung University (NCTU), Bell Laboratories and the University of Stuttgart. 
His research interests include the areas of information theory, 
communication and coding theory, and signal processing techniques with 
applications to wireless and molecular communication networks, Internet of 
Things, and data analytics. Dr. Asyhari is a Fellow of the Higher Education 
Academy, U.K., and a Senior Member of the IEEE. He has received the 
notable Samsung Global Research Outreach Award, in 2017, the Silver 
Medal at the International Trade Fair iENA 2017, the IEEE EURASIP Best 
Paper Award from the 11th IEEE—ISWCS 2014, Barcelona, Spain, the 
National Science Council of Taiwan Starting Grant, in 2013, and the 
Cambridge Trust – Yousef Jameel Scholarship. He has served as the 
Demo/Poster/WiP Chair of the IEEE DASC 2018, Greece, and was the 
Session Chair of the IEEE SSCI 2016, Greece, and the IEEE ISIT 2013, 
Turkey. He has served as a member of the Technical Programme Committee 
in a number of leading international conferences. He has been frequently 
invited to review articles in prestigious journals and conferences. Since 
2018, he has been an Associate Editor of IEEE ACCESS journal. 
 
YOONCHAN JHI received the BE and ME Degrees in 
Computer Science and Engineering from Inha 
University, South Korea, and the Ph.D. degree in 
Computer Science and Engineering from the 
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, in 2010. 
He is currently leading the Security Research Center at 
Samsung SDS, Seoul, South Korea. His research 
interests include programming languages, software analysis, network 
security, and systems security. His current work focuses on IoT and cyber-
physical systems-related security.  
 
LOUNIS CHERMAK (M’12) received his Engineering 
Degree in Electrical Engineering from Polytech’ 
Grenoble, Grenoble, France, in 2010. He then obtained 
an MSc. and Ph.D. degrees in Computer Vision from 
Cranfield University, Cranfield - Shrivenham, UK, in 
2011 and 2014 respectively. From 2014 to 2017 he held 
a position of Research Fellow. Since 2017, he is 
Assistant Professor in Computer Vision and 
Autonomous Systems at Cranfield University, Shrivenham, UK, where he 
currently leads the Autonomy Group and the Autonomous Systems 
Laboratory, in the Centre of Electronic Warfare Information and Cyber, at 
School of Defence and Security. He has authored and co-authored several 
technical papers and has been reviewer for high impact journals and 
conferences. His research interests include development and 
implementation of techniques and algorithms for visual based aerial, ground 
  
10 VOLUME XX, 2017 
and space applications towards perception and autonomous and mobility. 
He is a recipient of the Selwyn Award, from the Royal Photography Society 
in 2017. He also a technical member of the NATO Science and Technology 
Organization where he has been Co-Chairing an Exploratory Team and a 
Research Task Group activity on Autonomous Vehicle Technology since 
2018. 
 
CHAN YEOB YEUN holds M.Sc. (1996) and Ph.D. 
(2000) degrees in Information Security from Royal 
Holloway, University of London. After his Ph.D., he 
joined Toshiba TRL in Bristol, UK, and later became 
a Vice President at LG Electronics, Mobile Handset 
R&D Center, in Seoul, Korea (2005). He was 
responsible for developing mobile TV technologies 
and related security. He left LG Electronics in 2007 
and joined KAIST (Korea) until August 2008 and then Khalifa University 
Science and Technology in September 2008. He is currently a researcher in 
cybersecurity including IoT/USN security, cyber-physical system security, 
cloud/fog security and cryptographic techniques as an Associate Professor 
in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science and an 
active member of Center for Cyber-Physical Systems (C2PS). He also 
enjoys lecturing for M.Sc. Information Security and Ph.D. Engineering 
courses at Khalifa University. He has published more than 130 journal 
articles and conference papers, 9 book chapters and 10 international patent 
applications. He also serves on the editorial board of multiple international 
journals and on the steering committee of international conferences. He is a 
senior member of the IEEE.  
 
KAMAL TAHA is an Associate Professor in the 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at 
Khalifa University, UAE, since 2010. He received his 
Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Texas 
at Arlington, USA. He has over 90 refereed publications 
that have appeared in prestigious top ranked journals, 
conference proceedings, and book chapters. Over 20 of 
his publications have appeared in IEEE Transactions 
journals. He was as an Instructor of Computer Science at the University of 
Texas at Arlington, USA, from August 2008 to August 2010. He worked as 
Engineering Specialist for Seagate Technology, USA, from 1996 to 2005 
(Seagate is a leading computer disc drive manufacturer in the US). His 
research interests span bioinformatics, Information Forensics & Security, 
information retrieval, data mining, databases, and defect characterization of 
semiconductor wafers, with an emphasis on making data retrieval and 
exploration in emerging applications more effective, efficient, and robust. 
He serves as a member of the Program Committee, editorial board, and 
review panel for a number of international conferences and journals, some 
of which are IEEE and ACM journals. He is a Senior Member of the IEEE.  
 
